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THE LESSON OF ENRON FOR THE FUTURE 
OF MDPs: OUT OF THE SHADOWS AND  
INTO THE SUNLIGHT 
BURNELE V. POWELL* 
There are lessons to be learned from the Enron debacle,1 at least to the 
extent that one is seeking insights about the continuing debate over 
“when”—and not “whether”—multidisciplinary practice (MDP) rules will 
finally come to the legal profession.2 
The irony is that, despite the crushing victory3 that was supposed to end 
debate in the ABA House of Delegates (and the legal profession),4 the 
steam was recently knocked out of the anti-MDP movement by an 
unexpected development. In the wake of the House of Representatives’ 
 
 
 * Dean and Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; B.A. 1970, 
University of Missouri–Kansas City; J.D. 1973, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1979, Harvard 
University. The text of this Article was first presented at the 2002 F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and 
Securities Law Symposium at Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Debacle does not overstate the case. William C. Powers Jr., author of the Power’s Report, led 
Enron’s internal investigation of the company’s collapse. The report concluded, among other things, 
that in an attempt to stop financial hemorrhaging elsewhere: 
[o]ther transactions were implemented—improperly, we are informed by our accounting 
advisers—to offset losses. They allowed Enron to conceal from the market very large losses 
resulting from Enron’s merchant investments by creating an appearance that those 
investments were hedged—that is, that a third party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of 
those losses—when in fact that third party was simply an entity in which only Enron had a 
substantial economic stake. We believe these transactions resulted in Enron reporting 
earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 that were almost $1 
billion higher than should have been reported. 
Enron’s Many Strands: Excerpts From the Report of a Special Committee Investigating, Enron, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002. 
 2. As used here, multidisciplinary practice (MDP) is a law firm structure through which 
lawyers—freed of the prohibition under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (1983) 
[hereinafter Model Rule 5.4], forbidding lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers, but still subject 
to all other rules of lawyer professional responsibility—are permitted to have nonlawyer professionals 
as partners. See infra note 4. Such an MDP might exist in either a regular or a nonregular form, which 
is to say, supervised by a lawyer or by a nonlawyer, respectively, but its primary characteristic is that, 
while lawyers alone provide legal services, all work together as professional equals to deliver client 
services. 
 3. See John Gibeaut, House of Delegates Vote Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A. J., Sept. 
2000, at 92. 
 4. The American Bar Association House of Delegates voted by a margin of more than three to 
one to reject the recommendation of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice calling for a repeal 
of Model Rule 5.4, which would have permitted lawyers and any judicially approved professionals to 
join in equity partnerships. See ABA House of Delegates, unedited transcript of MDP debate (July 
2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp_hod_transc.html. See also Burnele V. Powell, Looking 
Ahead to the Alpha Jurisdiction: Some Considerations That the First MDP Jurisdiction Will Want to 
Think About, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101-02 (2001). 
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vote,5 our Canadian neighbors, the only lawyers in the world that even 
American lawyers would concede are as moral, ethical, and professional as 
they, adopted what was virtually the same rule that the ABA House had 
rejected, allowing MDPs.6 
But the first lesson of Enron is that everyone is now trying to spin the 
Enron story. Enron has become a guaranteed laugh-line—proof positive 
that any result we wish for can in fact be attained if only we do the math 
using mirrors, magic dust, and voodoo. 
Confirming Enron’s capacity to generate a laugh is the Internet 
headline parodying a recent movie. It simply read: “Crouching Profits, 
Hidden Debt: What happened and what does government have to do with 
it?”7 
A close second was from cybersatirist Bob Hirschfeld: 
“Ken Lay’s testimony before congress is being referred to as the story 
of “take the money Enron.”8  
But nobody is going to have the last word before Jay Leno. We hear 
from Leno that: 
Dick Cheney finally responded today to demands that he reveal the 
details of the Enron meetings. This is what he said. He met with 
unnamed people, from unspecified companies, for an indeterminate 
amount of time at an undisclosed location. Thank God he cleared 
that up. I’m ready to move on.9 
But, perhaps, the most ironic bit of humor comes from the University 
of Houston Communications Network Online. There, in the boldest red 
ink you will ever see, was the announcement of the “2000 Enron Teaching 
Excellence Awards.” The story recounted how a winning law professor, 
among others, had been awarded a $5000 teaching award for using his 
sense of humor to spark law students’ interest in traditionally dry topics, 
 
 
 5. The recommendation before the ABA House, in pertinent part, would have “permit[ted] 
lawyers to share fees and join with nonlawyers in a practice that delivers both legal and nonlegal 
professional services (“Multidisciplinary Practice” or “MDP”) provided that the lawyers have the 
control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services.” 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates (July 2000), 
Recommendation 1, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinarep2000.html [hereinafter MDP Final 
Report to House of Delegates]. 
 6. Canadian Bar Association, MDP Resolution 00-03-A (Aug. 2000), available at 
http://www.cba.org/EPIIgram/November2000/Resolution_00-03-A.asp. 
 7. Political Humor, About: With Donald Kurtzman, Daily Feeding Frenzy: Latest Political 
Quips, available at http://politicalhumor.about.com/library/bldailyfeed3.htm.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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such as security financing, business torts, and sales and leasing.”10 
The report went on to relate that one student admirer had described the 
professor as an example of how law school should always be taught, 
observing that: “I really appreciate his practical approach to the law. He 
presents cases to demonstrate how law is applied, not as the source of 
learning.”11 
It seems that only Arthur Andersen has fallen as low. Indeed, you know 
that you have hit bottom when it’s the politicians who are making jokes 
about you. President Bush used a great line: “The good news is that the 
Iraqis have agreed to allow the UN to audit their arms production. The bad 
news is that they want Arthur Anderson to handle the audit.”12 
But the truth is that the Enron bankruptcy is no laughing matter. The 
reality is that the seventh largest company in the United States declared 
what was then the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in history. After 
overstating annual income by 600 million dollars a year, Enron has finally 
owned up to the existence of offshore, off-book, sham companies that it 
was using to hide debt.13 Beyond the money, thousands of lives have been 
turned upside down14 or, in some instances, irreparably ruined.15 
 
 
 10. http://www.uh.edu/uhcnonline/2000enron.htm (May 3, 2000).  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. In their helpful historical account of the secret machinations that brought about Enron, Kurt 
Eichenwald and Diana B. Henriques noted that the creation of two off-shore entities, Chewco and 
JEDI, eventually came to the attention of Thomas H. Bauer, a partner in Andersen LLP in Washington, 
D.C. Bauer recognized the quandary: If the “side deal had shifted the ownership of Chewco away from 
independent investors,” that, in turn, meant “Chewco—and even JEDI—had never been independent 
entities. Instead, all of Enron’s transactions with them had simply been transactions with itself.” If that 
was the case, they were dealing with possibly criminal acts. Kurt Eichenwald & Diana B. Henriques, 
Enron’s Many Strands: The Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to a Shine Even as It Rotted 
From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A1. Similar offshore entities were also the focus of others, 
including Sherron S. Watkins, an Enron vice president. In her February 14, 2002, testimony before a 
hearing of a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee, she explained her efforts to bring her 
concerns to Kenneth Lay, Enron’s Chairman and CEO: 
My main point to Mr. Lay was that by this time Raptor owed Enron in excess of $700 million 
under certain hedging agreements. My understanding was that the Raptor entities basically 
had no other business aside from these hedges; therefore, they had collectively lost over $700 
million. I urged Mr. Lay to find out who lost that money. If he discovered that this loss would 
be borne by Enron shareholders, via an issuance of stock in the future, then I thought we had 
a very large problem on our hands. I gave Mr. Lay my opinion that it is never appropriate for 
a company to use its stock to affect its income statement. 
Enron’s Many Strands; ‘Lone Voice’: Excerpts From Testimony of Executive Who Challenged Enron, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at C7. 
 14. Many Enron employees were outraged at the fact that during the period when the price of 
their Enron stock holdings were precipitously declining, they were forbidden by the company to sell 
their stock. This so-called “lockdown” forced Enron employees—employees who on average had more 
than 60% of their 401(k)s in Enron stock—to lose as much as 90% of the value of their shares. Richard 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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When the laughter stops, when the stocks rebound (or, when the money 
is reinvested in the next hot company), when the hurt subsides, when the 
lives of the individuals and families are returned to equilibrium, it will be 
time for a full post-mortem.16 In advance of the reports of the 
congressional committees, the filing of Justice Department charges, and 
the political finger-pointing,17 I would like to sound a warning bell for the 
legal profession that, if not heeded, I predict will tomorrow make us as 
clearly deserving of a Jay Leno punch line as the accounting profession is 
today. 
In short, I want to remind the profession about what it already knows 
about this scandal and, most scarily of all, what we do not yet know. 
First, let’s consider what we know. We know that the two main villains 
in this scandal are two of the nation’s largest and most prestigious 
businesses. Enron Corporation was the seventh-largest corporation among 
the Fortune 500, and Arthur Andersen was one of the Big Four accounting 
firms. Each has now become a poster child for American corporate 
 
 
A. Oppel, Jr., Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Auditor Received Warning On Enron Five Months 
Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A1. 
 15. One lead made the point succinctly: “At the end of a week of high drama in Houston and 
Washington, J. Clifford Baxter, a former Enron vice chairman, was found dead in his locked car not 
far from his home in a Houston suburb. It was ruled a suicide.” Tom Redburn, Enron’s Many Strands: 
The Week That Was; A Suicide and a Resignation as the Formal Inquiries Get Under Way, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002. 
 16. The New York Times editorialized: 
The real scandal, as is often said during these post-mortems, may have been what was legal. 
How could Enron rely on hundreds of sham offshore subsidiaries to avoid paying income 
taxes in four of the last five years? How could thousands of employees’ retirement savings be 
threatened by their employer’s collapse? Who was overseeing the accountants, the financial 
world’s overseers? 
Editorial, The Enron Hearings; Cleaning Up After the Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at D12. 
The editorial went on to note that efforts at a full accounting would follow from a previous House 
Energy and Commerce Committee hearing on the accounting issue and would be followed by a Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee hearing. Id.  
 17. Discussing the lead partner on the Enron audits, David B. Duncan, who was fired after being 
accused of orchestrating the shredding of audit documents related to the Enron Corporation, Richard 
Oppel, Jr., writing for the New York Times, provided a useful and graphic portrayal of the events 
building in Washington: 
[Duncan] met for the second time this week with officials from the Justice Department, which 
is conducting a criminal investigation of Enron’s collapse. On Monday—the day before 
Andersen fired him—Mr. Duncan met with Justice Department officials as well as staff 
members from the S.E.C. and agents from the F.B.I., according to people close to the 
inquiries. This afternoon, he spent more than four hours answering questions from eight 
investigators for the House Energy and Commerce Committee, one of several panels in 
Congress reviewing Enron’s demise. Flanked by his lawyers, Mr. Duncan was not sworn, but 
he was warned not to give false statements to Congress. There was no discussion of giving 
him immunity for his testimony, investigators said. 
Oppel, Enron’s Collapse, supra note 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/5
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culture. Enron has come to stand for the most arrogant kind of corporate 
greed,18 Arthur Andersen for the kind of hold-your-nose-and-grab-the-
money conflicts of interest19 that has similarly made American lawyers 
less respected over the past two decades.20 
We also know that the prestigious Vinson & Elkins (V&E) law firm 
will, at the end of the day, be shown to have taken not simply one free 
bite, but at least two oversized gulps.21 First, it advised Enron regarding 
the legitimacy of Enron’s proposed securitization plans. Then, as the 
legitimacy of those plans was being called into question, and as it became 
clear that there were serious questions about whether Enron had failed 
properly to account for the debt generated by the transactions, it took a 
second tasty gulp. V&E agreed to conduct a review of the very structures 
it had helped to set in place.22 
 
 
 18. It was not simply that Enron aggressively pursued profit or even that it was willing to take 
great risk. What raised even more concerns was its willingness to provide favored investors with 
briefings that were not generally available. This “information gap between partnership investors and 
public stockholders,” placed strains on Enron, as the parent corporation, to stem losses that ultimately 
Enron would be required to pay off in its stock. Diana B. Henriques & Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog Over 
Enron, And the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002, at C1. See supra note 13 (transactions 
with itself). 
 19. Id. (“The firms act both as independent auditors—which companies must have, by federal 
law—and consultants on tax and technology issues.”) 
 20. See, e.g., The Image of Lawyers, at http://www2mnbar.org/benchbar/2000/apr00/survey-
sez_400.htm (76% of respondents agreed that public resentment of lawyers’ fees and income account 
for a significant part of lawyers’ negative public image); John S. Athens, Woe Unto You Lawyers—The 
Tarnished Image—Part II, Its Causes, available at http://www.family.org/cforum/attorney/ 
truth/a0014530.html (noting that high legal fees are most frequently complained of); Charles A. 
Maddock, Lawyers’ Image: The ABA Perspective, available at http://www.altmanweil.com/about/ 
articles/archive/article.cfm?ArticleID=108 (noting that the public perceives that lawyers are focused 
on billable hours and revenue rather than solving problems). 
 21. Here is how the New York Times described what should have been the impact of the Watkins 
letter: 
But this letter was not some mundane complaint. The writer described in detail problems with 
Enron’s partnerships, problems that the letter claimed would cause huge financial upheavals 
at the company in as little as a year. “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave 
of accounting scandals,” the letter’s author wrote. “Skilling is resigning for ‘personal 
reasons,’ but I think he wasn’t having fun, looked down the road and knew this stuff was 
unfixable and would rather abandon ship now than resign in shame in two years.”  
 Mr. Lay took a copy of the letter to James V. Derrick Jr., Enron’s general counsel, who 
agreed it needed to be investigated. They decided to assign the task to Vinson & Elkins—
which had helped prepare some of the legal documents for some of the partnerships. Enron 
wanted answers fast, and told the outside lawyers not to spend time examining the accounting 
treatment recommended by Arthur Andersen—although that was the heart of the letter’s 
warnings. 
Eichenwald & Henriques, Enron’s Many Strands, supra note 13. 
 22. Evidence is now coming out that indicates Watkins’ view was also shared among a number 
of the 200 lawyers within Enron’s own legal staff. In his article for the National Law Journal, David 
Hechler quotes one lawyer as saying: “‘Clearly, if you were going to do an in-depth investigation into 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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We know, furthermore, that Enron engaged Arthur Andersen to act 
both as Enron’s auditor and its business consultant.23 It was an 
arrangement that is apparently blessed by generally accepted accounting 
practices, but one that has been roundly condemned by everyone except 
the accounting industry. It is as though the accounting profession has had a 
pimple on its nose for a decade, but they still have not seen it.24 
Further still, we know that on Thursday, February 14, 2002, Enron 
executive Sherron Watkins told Congress that she warned then-Chairman 
Kenneth Lay the previous summer that investors were being misled by 
inflated profit statements.25 Despite that, Watkins told legislators that she 
“never heard reassuring explanations.”26 
In sum, no matter how we consider it, smell,27 taste,28 sight,29 or 
 
 
those structures . . . and you wanted that to be particularly rigorous, you would not use the firm 
involved in structuring them.’” David Hechler, Enron’s Legal Staff Battered, Confused, NAT’L L.J. 
(Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.nlj.com/special/0204enron.shtml. “‘It was absolutely against 
any common sense,’ says another who works abroad. ‘I don’t have to be a lawyer to determine that.’” 
Id. Hechler quotes another attorney: “‘You have to realize that [General Counsel James V.] Derrick 
was asleep at the wheel. He can’t have a memo coming out criticizing these structures. So he hires his 
old firm.’” Id. 
 Still, the most devastating question put by Hechler is the one that now begs our attention: Even 
assuming that only a couple of dozen of the two hundred-plus lawyers at Enron knew about the 
decision to give Vinson and Elkins a second bite: “Did any Enron lawyers complain to Derrick at the 
time?” Id. 
 It is as dismaying as it is regrettable, but to date it appears that nobody did.  
 23. See ROBERT BRYCE & MOLLY IVINS, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF 
ENRON (chronicling the corruption of the Enron Corporation through the illicit sexual affairs of the 
company’s top echelon) and Diego Ribadeneira’s book review of Pipe Dreams, Diego Ribadeneira, 
How Questionable Business Decisions and a Culture of Corrpution Did Enron In, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 4, 2002, at E7, where Ribadeneira observes: 
Bryce also recounts the appalling lack of oversight of Enron’s venal bookkeeping by his 
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. As is now well known, Andersen also received lucrative 
consulting fees from Enron, so it had little incentive to diligently audit the firm’s finances. 
“By the late 1990s Andersen had become so reliant on Enron that it simply could not afford to 
lose the company as a client,” Bryce writes. “Enron understood that and used that fact to its 
advantage.” The ties between the two were so tight that Andersen’s lead partner on the Enron 
account worked out of Enron’s building. 
 24. The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice was not alone in recognizing that the image of 
the accounting profession was being scarred by its tolerance of such an obvious conflict of interest. As 
the Commission reported: “In a letter from the Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), this Commission was advised that the SEC has asked the 
Independence Standards Board (ISB) to place the topic of legal advisory services on its agenda.” The 
MDP Report, infra note 45. 
 25. See supra note 13. 
 26. Enron’s Many Strands; ‘Lone Voice’: Excerpts from Testimony of Executive Who Challegned 
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at C7 (Sherron Watkins’ statement before leaving of House Energy 
and Commerce Subcommittee as recorded by the Federal News Service). 
 27. See supra note 16 (the real scandal is “what was legal”). 
 28. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (two big gulps). 
 29. See supra text following notes 9-10 (red-bannered teaching award). 
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sound,30 we can already say that as bad as we know Enron is today, we 
also know that it has the potential to become quite a bit worse.31  
Beyond this summary, we also know that there is still plenty that we do 
not know. 
To begin with, on the most revealing issue of what went wrong at 
Enron, we do not know the answer to the classic Watergate question: 
What did Kenneth Lay,32 Jeffrey K. Skilling,33 J. Clifford Baxter,34 and 
Andrew S. Fastow35 know, and when did they know it. For the time being, 
Lay has exercised his right to remain silent, so it may be a very long time 
before we know anything substantial.36 
We also do not know why Arthur Andersen continued to give Enron 
clean audits, despite their concerns about whether Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles would require that investors be provided enough 
notice about the status of the company to be able to decide whether 
investing would be prudent.37 
Most importantly, what we do not know about either Enron or Arthur 
Andersen is what, if any, role lawyers in the firms38 played in facilitating 
 
 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18 (a warning bell). 
 31. Every large institution, whether an underwriter or partnership investor, that was aware of 
material information withheld from Enron investors could find itself in court, securities lawyers said. 
Already, they said, lawyers who specialize in suing corporations are discussing which investors, 
institutions and advisers are potential defendants.  
 “The image I have in my mind is a long, long line of the wealthy and the powerful who made 
money out of these deals, all set up to hand it over to the people who lost everything in their Enron 
investments,” said Mr. Moriarty, the Houston lawyer. “This is what the Marines like to call a target-
rich environment.” Henriques & Eichenwald, A Fog Over Enron, supra note 18. 
 32. Lay was Enron’s Chairman and CEO at the time of the company’s bankruptcy. 
 33. Skilling was Enron’s Chief Executive Officer, but quit prior to the company’s bankruptcy. 
 34. Baxter was a former Enron Corporation Vice Chairman who apparently committed suicide 
following the company’s bankruptcy. Jim Yardley, Critic Who Quit Top Enron Post Is Found Dead, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A5. See supra note 15. 
 35. Fastow was Enron’s former Chief Financial Officer. 
 36. “Lay told a Senate hearing that he was ‘deeply troubled’ by asserting his constitutional right 
under the Fifth Amendment not to answer questions about the financial dealings that led to Enron’s 
bankruptcy—a collapse that devastated thousands of workers and investors and rattled Wall Street.” 
Susan Schmidt, Enron’s Lay Declines to Talk, But Senators Say A Lot to Him: Ex-Company Leader 
Hears Barbs, Claims Fifth Amendment Right, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002. 
 37. Enron might argue that the information potential partnership investors got was not important 
enough to require disclosure. But lawyers said the fact that Enron disclosed the information to them at 
all would be evidence in itself that such details were material.  
 “Given that they give the information to somebody else as part of their bargain to raise money for 
another deal, there is a strong likelihood that it would reach the materiality level,” said Stanley Arkin, 
a corporate and securities lawyer in New York. Henriques & Eichenwald, supra note 18. 
 38. See Daly, infra note 48, discussing relative sizes of accounting firms, law firms, and the 1500 
lawyers within the law offices of Arthur Andersen Corporation, citing Annual Survey of the Nation’s 
Largest Law Firms, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at C5. The two largest firms are Baker & McKenzie 
with 2,343 lawyers and Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue with 1,276. But see supra note 22 and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the creation and operation of Enron’s offshore businesses. Nor do we 
know what role lawyers may have played in some of Enron’s other 
activities, such as the shredding of documents in an apparent effort to 
frustrate an expected criminal investigation. 
Finally, we must consider that there is another dimension—neither past 
nor future—that challenges a full understanding of the Enron-Authur 
Anderson story. Understanding conduct in this dimension is cruicial 
precisely because so little can be known about it. Indeed, for the legal 
profession, the tragedy of Enron is not what we already know it is what we 
do not yet know but can reasonably expect eventually to learn. 
I began worrying about the lawyers operating in the unobservable 
dimension (the lawyers whom I have regularly referred to as the lawyers 
engaged in “gray lawyering”) even before the time that I was asked to 
serve on the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.39 During my 
tenure, however, I came to understand that the Commission would not be 
seen in its fullest light for some time to come. In this regard, it would be 
like the Kutak Commission (in its call for a comprehensive rethinking of 
the ethical premises and problems of the legal profession40), the 
Commission on Nonlawyer Practice (in its call for the expansion of 
permissible activities by nonlawyers in order to increase the public’s 
access to the justice system and to affordable assistance with its legal and 
law-related needs41), and the McKay Report (in its call for totally open 
lawyer disciplinary proceedings42). 
Contrary to the kind of knee-jerk, head-in-the-sand response that 
usually accompanies pleas for reform, I predict that, despite what may be 
the legal profession’s initial reaction, the Enron scandal will eventually 
prove to be a catalyst for lawyer multidisciplinary practice reform. This 
reform will be second only to the reform of the accountants’ 
auditing/consulting rule mentioned above.43 
 
 
accompanying text (nobody complained). 
 39. Elsewhere I have observed that “the legal profession may well have lost its chance to address 
the only concern arising during the entire three-year MDP debate about which proponents on all sides 
found agreement: that something must be done about the increasing phenomenon of “gray lawyering.” 
Powell, Looking Ahead, supra note 4, at 100-15 n.50. 
 40. See Chair’s Introduction, ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). 
 41. See Summary of Recommendations, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS, 
A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1995). 
 42. See American Bar Association, Recommendation 7, Access to Disciplinary Information, 
LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992). 
 43. See supra notes 23-24. 
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I assert, second, that upon the conclusion of the Enron debacle, each of 
the rationalizations to which opponents of MDP pointed two years ago44 
will have proven demonstrably false in the real-life test of Enron. 
Third, and finally, I assert that the one thing that will become clear 
when the dust settles after Enron is that if the legal profession had put the 
multidisciplinary practice safeguards in place two years ago when it had 
the opportunity to do so, Enron would probably not have happened. 
Before I go on, however, let me be quick to point out that when I 
endorse lawyer multidisciplinary practice reform, I am speaking 
essentially of the initial proposal advanced by the MDP Commission 
(MDP-I).45 MDP-I was met by opposition that, first, made many 
outrageous misrepresentations about it, and then fell back on the tried-and-
tested strategy of ABA House of Delegates debate: it stalled for time.46 
Still, I endorse MDP-I today with fervor equaled only by my rejection 
of the weak political compromise cobbled together by the Commission in 
hopes of finding common ground with the MDP opponents.47 What the 
Commission never understood was that it should have taken the opponents 
at their word: that they were committed to ending any discussion of MDP, 
no matter its merits.48 
 
 
 44. For an expanded discussion of the key critiques of the Commission’s report, see generally 
Burnele V. Powell, Flight from the Center: Is It Just or Just About Money?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 
1455-64 (2000) (noting that neither the supposed risk to the core values of the profession, the 
presumed economic inability of lawyers to operate in the marketplace, nor the likely unwillingness of 
the courts and regulatory agencies to confront a Big Four accounting firm provided a reasonable basis 
for opposing MDPs). 
 45. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 
1999), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html [hereinafter the MDP Report]. 
 46. It should be noted for historical accuracy that in placing the MDP Report on the ABA House 
of Delegates Agenda, the Commission had always intended to withdraw it. The purpose for scheduling 
it for debate was to assure that the membership understood that the debate had progressed to a point 
when a serious proposal was in play. MDP opponents, however, in a brilliant tactical move, refused to 
allow withdrawal of the resolution without being afforded time to debate it. As a result, debate ensued 
in which the report’s supporters argued that the report should be withdrawn from further debate and 
the opponents argued that the report should be withdrawn with the problematical condition that it not 
be brought back before the House until it was vetted with everyone who might oppose it. For a 
summary of this “non-debate” debate, see Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 44, at 1455. 
 47. The MDP Report, supra note 5. 
 48. No stronger evidence of that intent should be needed than the resolution (and supporting 
report) that New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) President Steven C. Krane placed before the 
ABA House of Delegates on October 30, 2001. Although the report characterized the resolution as 
provid[ing] a clear ethical framework for lawyers or law firms owning and operating nonlegal 
businesses and for lawyers or law firms wishing to form contractual relationships with nonlegal 
professionals or nonlegal professional service firms, the resolution, in fact, did nothing more than 
recycle a proposal previously adopted, July 24, 2001, by the Presiding Justices of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, effective on November 1, 2001. Rather than allow for the 
establishment of MDPs, the NYSBA proposal merely restated the scope of contractual relationships 
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I turn, then, to my prediction that the Enron Scandal will prove to be a 
catalyst for lawyer multidisciplinary practice reform. While it is 
understandable why the expectation is high that there will be reform of the 
accountants’ standards of ethics, the conventional view holds that “It is 
they, and not we.” 
The legal profession points, as the MDP Commission did two years 
ago, to the unavoidable conflict that exists when an accounting firm is 
engaged to review the books of a company in aid of the need for public 
accountability and, at the same time, is engaged by that same company as 
a consultant charged with the task of expanding the company’s business in 
a variety of ways.49 What is ironic is that it was the very identification of 
this conflict that opponents of MDP used against the Commission by 
asserting that the Commission had failed to propose rules in MDP-I that 
would have outlawed the practice. Of course, the Commission never had 
claimed or wanted the power to supplant the regulatory function of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. It was therefore understandable to 
all who actually wanted the issue addressed—as opposed to those engaged 
in political posturing—that the proper disposition was the one the 
Commission advanced: point to the fact that the SEC had already advised 
the Commission that, it had jurisdiction, and would resolve the matter.50 
Notwithstanding the need to correct the auditing/consulting rule, there 
remains another area that accountants must reform. The heart of the 
problem is that accountants reject the notion of the unitary firm. In such a 
view, all conflicts are personal. Thus, when Arthur Andersen is engaged to 
represent Alpha Auto Co., it can also represent Beta Auto Co. so long as 
the accountants operate behind firewalls on a need-to-know basis. In the 
instances of both the conflicting functions situation (auditing/consulting) 
and the conflicting interest situation (simultaneous representation of 
competitors), as I will make clear shortly, the rule should prohibit current 
accountant behavior, at least to the extent that such behavior involves the 
work of lawyers. 
But again, the legal profession’s hands are not clean with respect to 
 
 
that lawyers in New York (and elsewhere) have always had available, and declared—“Schazaam!”—
that such side agreements constitute MDPs. But see The MDP Report, supra note 45, at C2-C4. See 
also Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services 
from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000) (providing 
summary of various models for lawyer-nonlawyer cooperation in the delivery of professional 
services).  
 49. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (general awareness of longstanding problem). See 
also MDP Final Report to House of Delegates, supra note 5 (SEC action). 
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either of these conflicts. The problem, as I have alluded to earlier, is the 
existence of “gray” lawyers.51 Many know that Arthur Andersen is already 
one of the world’s largest law firms.52 What we do not yet know is 
precisely how many lawyers53 were working at Enron before the collapse. 
I submit that if there was even a single lawyer working for Enron outside 
its corporate counsel’s office that is too many. What I suspect, however, is 
that just as we have seen the radical expansion of the number of lawyers 
going to work in accounting firms such as Arthur Andersen, there has been 
a corresponding rise in the number of lawyers operating as gray lawyers in 
the rest of corporate America. 
By “gray lawyers,” I am talking about those lawyers who do not 
practice law, but who practice tax advising, business consulting, economic 
planning, business advising, and the like. They are lawyers because they 
continue to hold licenses as lawyers, but, and here the only check is their 
self-description, they are not practicing law. Or should I say, at least, they 
do not wish to be regulated as though they are practicing law. 
It is, moreover, the reality of these gray lawyers that spurs my second 
assertion: that each of the rationalizations to which opponents of MDP 
pointed two years ago has proven demonstrably false in the real-life test of 
Enron. 
Those close to the debate will recall that MDP opponents adopted an 
almost jingoistic posture in their opposition to any change that would 
allow lawyers and other professionals to join together as economic equals. 
They claimed that such professional cooperation would undermine the 
core values of the legal profession, in that it would allow lawyers to 
engage in conflicts of interest to the detriment of their clients, prevent 
lawyers from maintaining the confidences and secrets of their clients, 
undermine lawyers’ capacity to provide competent representation, and 
destroy the commitment to community represented by the obligation of 
lawyers to provide pro bono legal representation.54 
When MDP proponents pointed out that the Commission had, in fact, 
 
 
 51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (gray lawyers). 
 52. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 53. Here my interest is in the total number of licensed attorneys, whether or not they were a part 
of the corporate counsel office. But see supra note 22 (200 Enron lawyers). 
 54. See Powell, Looking Ahead, supra note 4, at 104 (“[I]f the decision to permit MDPs is to turn 
on the question of the legal profession’s commitment to protecting its core values—protections for 
confidentiality, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, the exercise of competency, and the protection of 
the legal culture—those values cannot legitimately include a fifth “C,” the commoditization of 
clients.”). Note, too, that the obligation to act pro bono publico, Model Rule 6.1 is an obligation of 
conscience, if an obligation at all. 
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made no recommendation that would change any rule of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (except to lift the relatively recently created 
bar under Model Rule 5.4, prohibiting the sharing of fees with 
nonlawyers) the opponents simply sighed and repeated their claims. In the 
repeating, however, there was always a story. It was a story that harkened 
back to the long-lost golden era of law practice, when lawyers working in 
large law firms guarded the virtue of the legal profession and the backsides 
of their clients. Lawyers were not simply agents, they served as the 
consciences of their clients and the legal profession. Corporate and 
government counsel were acknowledged to exist, but were still not fully 
trusted. What had to be avoided at all costs was to allow lawyers to be 
sullied by sharing fees with nonlawyers. Such sharing, without anything 
else, was the equivalent of abandoning one’s client for lucre. 
This simplistic notion of the legal profession worked on two levels. 
First, opponents to lawyers sharing fees with other professionals were 
freed from the obligation to make any case other than the argument that 
things are perfectly fine now, so there is no need for change. Furthermore, 
at a second level, the opponents of MDP would claim that the already-
existing safeguards also protected the economic interests of lawyers. In a 
world where even the largest law firms were unlikely to be able to 
compete against the deep-pocket economic interest of even a small 
international accounting firm, a line—any line—had to be drawn. 
The problem with this argument can be summed up in one name: 
Vinson & Elkins. What the Enron scandal means, at the very least, is that 
the presumed protection of the golden era ethos provides no safeguard for 
either clients or the legal profession. Vinson & Elkins, a large, well-
respected, powerful law firm, I remind you, was not an MDP operating 
under the supposed thumb of Arthur Andersen or Enron. Vinson & Elkins 
was the independent, outside counsel. The tragedy of Enron, though, may 
well be that when the story broke of who was protecting the interest of the 
client, we discovered that the interest of the client (viz., the Enron 
Corporation, itself) was not protected by outside counsel, nor by inside 
corporate counsel, but by a business operative, Enron Vice President for 
Corporate Development Sherron Watkins.55 
 
 
 55.  
 After nearly a decade at Enron, she was high up enough, or grumpy enough, to send the 
boss a pull-no-punches, put-it-on-record letter telling him—for a very detailed seven pages—
that his company was more or less a Ponzi scheme, and it sounds like she knew she wasn’t 
telling him anything he didn’t already know. She was circumspect enough to do some 
networking across the fence at Arthur Andersen and put the same concerns to Andersen’s 
Enron man, David Duncan, and two other partners. 
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Consider that fact for a moment. The opponents of MDP would have us 
believe that no one inside the corporation, no one beholding to an 
international accounting firm, no one who did not have independent 
ownership of a firm, could be expected to protect the interest of clients. 
Today, however, the evidence confirms what the Commission always said 
it would: there is no immutable connection between ownership and 
professional independence.56 It is not the origin of one’s income that 
counts; rather, it is the source of one’s values. Vinson & Elkins had all of 
the safeguards that the Golden Era protection rationale cites as 
determinative.57 Sherron Watkins had none. The MDP proposed by the 
Commission would have had even more such safeguards than either 
Vinson & Elkins or Sherron Watkins. 
The irony of the weak whistle blower brings me to my third point. I 
have urged that the one thing that will become clear when the dust settles 
over Enron is that if the legal profession had put the multidisciplinary 
practice safeguards in place two years ago, when it had the opportunity to 
do so, Enron would probably not have happened. 
The answer comes down to understanding what an MDP is and, 
conversely, what it is not. Thus far, I have proceeded on the assumption 
that everyone understands that a multidisciplinary practice is like a 
 
 
Frank Pellegrini, Person of the Week: “Enron Whistleblower” Sherron Watkins, Time Online Edition, 
at http://www.time.com/time/pow/article/0.8599,194927.00.html (Jan. 18, 2002).  
 56. Stuart S. Prince, Comment, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA’s Misguided Quash of the MDP 
Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2000): 
Those who oppose the recommended changes to the Model Rules cite many potential pitfalls 
of practicing law in the MDP setting. In particular, critics of MDPs believe that conflicts of 
interest between lawyers and their non-lawyer partners will often arise; that confidentiality 
duties of lawyers will conflict with those of non-lawyers; that lawyers will not be able to use 
independent judgment because of financial pressures; and that the attorney-client privilege 
will be eroded because of potential confidentiality breaches. In addition, some members of 
the ABA fear that the financial pressures within MDPs will diminish lawyers’ commitment to 
pro bono work. Finally, opponents fear that MDPs will have an adverse impact on the fiscal 
health of existing law practices, although many lawyers dispute this assertion. 
See also Robert K. Christensen, At the Helm of the Multidisciplinary Practice Issue After the ABA’s 
Recommendation: States Finding Solutions by Taking Stock in European Harmonization to Preserve 
Their Sovereignty in Regulating the Legal Profession, 2001 BYU L. REV. 375, 398-400 (2001); 
Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant Multidisciplinary Practice 
on the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33 (2001). But, more 
optimistically, see Daly, supra note 38, at 226, 263-69 (assessing the rewards and risk of MDPs). 
 57. Indeed, even the Commission was prepared to give a pass to the traditional law-firm 
structure. Although it proposed that nonregular MDPs—those headed by a lawyer—were to be free of 
the certification-audit requirement, it would have imposed such an obligation on MDPs headed by 
nonlawyers. See Powell, Looking Ahead, supra note 4, at 1451-53 (“[T]he requisite demonstrated 
commitment to the lawyer standards of professional conduct would be established in a different 
way.”). 
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traditional law firm, merely an administrative and accounting form. It 
differs from a traditional law firm, however, in one key respect and might 
differ, depending on the organizers, in a second respect. The first point of 
contrast with a traditional law firm is that the lawyers in an MDP may 
share equity with any other professional who is a member of the MDP, 
including nonlawyers, if the highest court in the jurisdiction authorizes the 
lawyer to join with such a professional.58 In all other respects, however, an 
MDP would look and operate exactly like a traditional law firm. 
Moreover, there are very intrusive qualification and oversight provisions 
that would guarantee that the operation of the MDP is as described here.59 
On that latter point of qualification and oversight provisions, the detail 
to keep in mind is that the right of a lawyer to operate as an MDP is a 
qualified one. To use the shorthand of the Commission’s discussions, any 
attorney might request authority to organize as an MDP, but only those 
lawyers who first established that they could meet the qualifying 
requirements of certification and audit would be allowed to do so.60 
But I previously noted that there is one other respect in which an MDP 
might differ from a traditional law firm. That situation might arise if the 
MDP were authorized to be owned61 by a nonlawyer, which is to say by 
some other professional whom the highest court in the jurisdiction has 
approved as eligible to be part of an MDP.62 Thus, unlike MDPs that look 
 
 
 58. The oversight of MDPs, like the oversight of traditional law firms, rests ultimately with the 
highest court of the jurisdiction. 
 59. One commentator has summarized the certifications required by the ABA Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice:  
 The MDP will not interfere with a lawyer’s independent professional judgment and will 
establish procedures to protect such independent judgment; 
 The MDP will establish procedures to segregate client funds as required by the legal 
profession; All members of the MDP providing/assisting in the delivery of legal services will 
abide by the lawyer’s/legal rules of professional conduct; 
 The MDP will acknowledge the lawyers’ unique role in society and in the administration 
of justice including rendering pro bono publico services;  
 The MDP will annually review all above procedures for effectiveness and amend as 
needed; and  
 The MDP will file a certification annually with the appropriate court and permit the court 
to conduct audits of the MDP while bearing the costs of any such audits. 
Marc N. Biamonte, Multidisciplinary Practices: Must a Change to Model Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law 
Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2001).  
 60. See The MDP Report, Recommendation 14, supra note 45. 
 61. For our discussion purposes, “owned” means having more than 50% of the equity interest or 
the right to control a lawyer. 
 62. The Commission ultimately abandoned the audit and certification provision, deciding not to 
include them in its final Recommendation to House of Delegates. See MDP Final Report to the House 
of Delegates, supra note 5.  
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like the traditional law firm (except for, of course, the professional 
partner), the nonregular MDP would have to meet a further substantial 
requirement. 
More specifically, nonregular MDPs could qualify to operate only if 
they cleared the audit and certification requirement, which would require 
that a firm prepare a self-study report describing in detail its proposed 
standards and procedures of operation. Thereafter, the firm would be 
audited by outside lawyer experts63 to determine whether the proposed 
safeguards and procedures were, in fact, in place and workable. 
Note, too, that the cost of the certification and audit process would be 
borne by the MDP petitioner. Further, the self-study certification and audit 
would be as probing as the highest court in each jurisdiction required in 
order to satisfy itself that adequate safeguards for the public, the courts, 
and the legal profession existed. Finally, authorization for a nonregular 
MDP to operate could be made conditional or otherwise limited in terms 
of authority, function, duration, or the like. 
Perhaps now it becomes clear why I have asserted that the Enron 
scandal could not have happened if an MDP had been imposed on Enron 
(or for that matter on Arthur Andersen). If the Supreme Court of the State 
of Texas, for example, had said to all lawyers working at Enron that you 
must either join the staff of in-house counsel, organize yourself as an 
MDP, or relinquish your license to practice law in this jurisdiction, the 
result would instantaneously have been the virtual deputizing of a host of 
whistle-blowers in the corporation.64 There simply would have been no 
place to end-run! 
Rather than the gray world of lawyers practicing “not-practicing,” a 
single regulatory regime would govern.  
In concluding, let me suggest what I believe to be the real lesson of 
Enron—the one that is likely to be missed in the distrust and 
disillusionment that is the immediate aftermath of Enron’s collapse. What 
should not be missed is that both Enron and Andersen still have available 
those same safeguards that I previously suggested would have precluded 
 
 
 In a search of a political deal before the ABA House of Delegates, the Commission abandoned the 
regulatory distinction between regular MDPs—those controlled by lawyers—and nonregular MDPs—
those controlled by nonlawyer. For a discussion on the differences between regular and nonregular 
MDPs, see Powell, Flight from the Center, supra note 44, at 1452. 
 63. These experts would serve, generally, as masters, working under the supervision of the 
lawyer disciplinary program. 
 64. It is conceivable, too, that other jurisdictions might also have mandated their lawyers to 
either organize as MDPs or relinquish their licenses. Regardless of the course taken, the resulting 
scrutiny would have achieved its purpose. 
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the ability of gray lawyers to operate at Enron.65 Although the MDP 
Commission anticipated that the certification and audit procedure would 
be imposed as a quid pro quo for permission to establish an MDP, the 
reality is that the power voluntarily to practice law in a transparent manner 
was, and remains, available to the Enron Corporation and all others 
wishing to underscore their commitment to serving the interest of clients 
in a quality manner. The fact is, just as there must be an Alpha 
Jurisdiction—a first jurisdiction to adopt MDP procedures that allow 
lawyers and other professionals to work together in partnerships—there 
must also be an Alpha Corporation—one that embraces the ideal of having 
its lawyers step out of the gray shadows and into the sunlight where the 
highest fiduciary obligations are pursued in behalf of clients. As Enron 
proceeds in bankruptcy to reorganize, no matter the ultimate result, it will 
find itself much the poorer if it fails to reorganize the way in which its 
lawyers interact with each other, other professionals and, most 
importantly, clients.  
 
 
 65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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